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I. TERMS OF REFERENCE 
1. The Council Decision of 15 December 1981 amending the method of 
adjusting the remuneration of officials and other servants of the 
Communities (the ••method .. ) laid down the procedures for 
calculating the specific indicator and the control Indicator. 
The specific indicator is one of the components of the method for 
adjusting the salaries of the Community civil service. It Is the 
composite Indicator which measures the average trend in the 
purchasing power of salaries In the national civil services of 
the Twelve. The control Indicator is used to check the validity 
of the specific Indicator. 
2. The method requires the Statistical Office of the European 
Communities (Eurostat) to carry out various checks. The means at 
Eurostat's disposal Include the possibility of asking the 
national authorities for additional Information and of reporting 
to the Commission If need be. Such Is the context of the present 
report. 
3. 1 n 1 ts annua I report to the Counc I I for 1989, the CommIssion 
expressed surprise at the stead II y IncreasIng divergence 
(particularly in 1989) between the trend in the specific 
Indicator and that In the control Indicator. 
The administration accordingly requested Eurostat to look Into 
this matter. 
4. Eurostat placed this question on the agenda for the annual 
meeting of the Working Party on Article 65 of the Staff 
Regu 1 at ions, whIch was he I d on 9 March 1990, and prepared some 
relevant facts and figures for the meeting (see Annex 1: 
Comparison of the trends In the specific Indicator and the 
control indicator). The object of this meeting was to define the 
problem and to obtain the initial views of the national experts, 
with a view to explaining at least why there was a divergence. 
A further meeting of the Working Party was held on 7 June 1990 to 
invest I gate the matter more closely on the basis of a second 
working paper (see Annex 2) and to obtain some figures from the 
national experts. 
Neither of these meetings achieved any significant breakthrough 
towards an understanding of the problem. A different approach 
should therefore be considered. 
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II. ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM 
5. Although constructed In different ways, both Indicators reflect 
closely related phenomena. 
The purpose of the specIfIc I nd I cat or Is to take account of 
general trends In salaries (particularly any changes In salary 
scales). It is geared to the salaries of a sample of typical 
civil servants (In terms of family status, each typical official 
consists of two halves: an unmarried official and a married 
official with two dependent children). These typical officials 
do not qualify for any Individual payments and represent grades 
characteristic of the actual population. 
On the basis of the sample given for the central government 
departments of each Member State, an indicator Is calculated to 
reflect any changes In salary scales, assuming constant staff 
numbers (special reference being made to staff numbers In the 
previous year). 
The overall specific indicator for the Community Is obtained by 
weighting each national specific Indicator by a percentage 
representing the total emoluments of the respective civil service 
In relation to the Twelve as a whole. 
6. The national control indicators, on the other hand, reflect the 
trend In the average actual emoluments paid by central government 
departments. They thus take account of a II the components of 
such emoluments, Including both the remuneration paid to 
employees (salaries, bonuses, benefits, etc.) and the social 
contributions paid by the employer. 
The emoluments In question may be Influenced by a large number of 
factors, which may take the form of actual cash Increases: 
changes In salary scales overall or for part lcular 
categories; 
Individual increases obtained as a result of promotion or a 
change of grade; 
Individual arrangements (Including bonuses, merit awards, 
overtime payments, etc.), 
or may be structura I effects due to the numbers entering or 
leaving the service. 
7. The design and components of the two indicators tend to produce 
divergences between them. These may arise, for example, from the 
structural effect, the different reference period used for each 
indicator or the Individual cash Increases affect lng only the 
total emoluments actually paid. 
An analysis of the factors making for divergence should, however, 
make It possible to assess whether the specific Indicator Is a 
true reflection of the various salary adjustments at national 
level. 
-4-
a. The fact that a very sharp divergence occurs in certain 
countries, sometimes after several years of parallel trends, may 
be attributable to new salary policies not fully reflected In the 
specific indicators. 
In other countries the permanent divergence between the two 
Indicators could be interpreted as meaning that only one of these 
Indicators Is taking account of some substantial and highly 
variable Individual salary components. 
Apart from the f tgures as such, these dIvergent trends are an 
Interesting Indication of any structural changes and deserve 
closer examination In this context. 
Ill. RECOMMENDATIONS 
9. For the purposes of assessing the divergence between the specific 
and the control Indicators, the indicators for total emoluments 
should be supplemented by a more precise determination of changes 
In the actual emoluments paid by central government departments. 
This could be done: 
(a) as regards the numbers employed, 
by selecting the population so that it coincides more 
closely with that covered by the specific Indicator; 
by determining with great accuracy the numbers employed in 
each category and grade; 
by breaking down these numbers by type of employment 
(part-time or full-time); 
(b) as regards salaries, 
by describing and quantifying the components of total 
emoluments, and In particular the main and subsidiary forms 
of remuneration, and the ways in which each of these 
components may be adjusted. 
10. The data available from national sources should be analysed in 
depth to assess how far the national specific Indicators are a 
true reflection of changes In the purchasing power of national 
clvl I servants. 
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11. The competent authorities In the Member States should also: 
- outline the general philosophy behind their 
remuneration (whether based on across-the-board 
individual Increases); 
system of 
Increases or 
- specify the dates and the size of any Increases obtained, In 
whatever form, over the past ten years by the nat lona I c I vII 
servants who make up the reference popu I at ion for the specIfIc 
Indicator; 
- provide additional indicators (If available) which reflect the 
changes In the salaries of national civil servants In their 
country: these should be indicators appearing regularly in 
official publications and forming part of series which are 
sufficiently long to provide a basis for assessment; 
- give details of the procedures for deriving net salary from the 
gross salary. 
IV. CONCLUS IONS 
12. The action recommended will represent a sizeable task and should 
therefore be concentrated on those countrIes whIch have most 
Influence on the overal I divergence. Eurostat considers that the 
four countries which have a preponderant Influence In the 
Community as a whole (United Kingdom, France, Italy and Germany) 
and which account for SOX of the weighting appl led to the 
Indicators are responsible for 701 of the divergence between the 
Indicators. Consequently, and given the resources available, the 
Invest I gat ion shou I d pr I mar II y concern I tse If with these 
countries. The other countries showing substantial divergence 
should not be neglected, however, and could be examined at a 
later date. 
In the near future, therefore, Eurostat wi II be conduct lng a 
series of investigations within the competent bodies of the 
Member States concerned. 
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Comp3.rison retween the treo:i in emol~ts 
in central adm:i..ni.stra. tians 
ani the t:!'e!rl. in ~ gross spec:Lfic i ni 1 ce to::-
ANNEX 1 
_. TOe metbcd for adjust:i.Dg the remu11eraticm of Cormm.mi.ty offi.c.ia.ls an:: 
otb.er' servants provides for ecljustments to be ne.de in net terms \l7i tb. t.b..P. 
help of a. specific 1rrl1cator. This ~:;pecific in4icat.or is i!ltt:mei t..o 
mea.sure tbe ave.r:uge c:bunge in the purcha:•dng power of sa.la.ries ill the 
mtiODa.l civil services of the MenJ:er States. It is cur.re;ntl y :prcduce:l 
by reference to tbe saJ.a.ry scales in the various ciVi-l services, 'llSi.Dg a. 
ID():jeJ l::asei 50);; on UI!tn9.1Tied offic:l a, s ani 5C% on ma..rrieri. officials ~'ith 
two depei:rl.ent cbiJ.dren. 
2. The metbai aJ..so IIEkes provisiOD. for a. control in:ii.ca.tor h?serl cm 
per mW.t.a 6Il'Jluments in na;tiora.l central administrations ani ca.lculatcl 
in accord.a.nce wi tb. the def"i -n; t:i.ons given by tbe SEA un:ier bear; rgs .:03 
to 413 (gross wages ani sa.l.aries, enployers' actua.l social cc::rtrililt:Lr-ns 
ani impu.tei sccia.J. ccmtributians) . ~ in:lica. tor is sb.aw:l i:l t.ab.le 861 
of tbe annnaJ Eurosta.t l~ on treo:is in public serv.i.ce remmerc.:ticm.. 
3. 'lllese two iniica tors sb.ould m::rve in p3..Iallel ani any di ve:rge::l8€S !:e ~'Pt'€e!l 
then, especi.a.lly when they CXXJUr u:nexpecte:il y, must be exp 1 a i nei _ Such 
di vergeoces may for examp..le reflect cba.nges in tbe structure of the 
civ.U service concernerl. tn ~hich case the scale ani signi.fi<"'..a.:xe of 
these cba.nges should be ascert.=d rei. 
Tbe text of tbe metho:i sti pula. tes tha. t any problems 'W'bich ar-ise in 
calcu1at:lng the specific iD:lica.tors are to be exami ne:i by the 
u ArtiCle 65'' working :r:artY, Vr"b.icb. is tberefo:re resp;:msible £or looking 
into a.rrl explainirg on a. case-by-case l::a.s:1.s any diverg~ J::ett,.7een t-....~ 
tw 1m1catars. 
4. In the interests of clarification, Earosta t ha.s ctra:wn ,_"P g::a~ sbo;.;j ~ 
the ~es in the gross speci.:fic iniica. tor a.ni the iniicator of 
atru'lliDE'Jlts (S61) sb:)e the ~t metbo:l was intrcducei. T.be gross 
specific ; rdj ca tor represents gross d:Ja.Dges m the sa.J..a.ries o£ na. ticn=.l 
civil servants after the deduct:i.on o£ scc1al cantr-i.J:utions rut 1:ef~---e 
tax. 
The il:xiica.tors are shcrwn in real terms. i:ak1 rg into a.o:x:n:!!lt na. tiC!'.lal 
ccst-<>£-li-viDg jmexes in the case of the gross specific il:rlicator and. 
other a;pp:I'Oplia.te defla.tors in the case o£ 001 ; they are also ~'"!l ~ 
nani naJ terms to eJ i mi mte the influence of these d.e.£1-a.tors an any 
divergences. 
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Heeti.ng of the Wor~ Party 
an Article 65 of tbe Staff RegUlations 
~ t 7 cl'une 1990 
ANNEX' 2 
ARr. 66/6 
Cl:llq:arison between tbe trem in total Emlluments in oentral 
admin1strations &D:l tbe trem in tbe grcsg speoifio i.D:iioator 
?!.. 
Comparison between the trerrl in total emoluments .in central administrations 
ani the tretrl in the gross specific irrlica tor 
B9~ouni 
1. Salary adjustments in the Community civil service axe gover:nai lega.ll y 
inter a] ja by the Staff Regulations a.rxi by the methcxi for adjusting 
remuneration (Council Decision of 15 December 1981). 
'nle two texts esta.bl j sh the principle that remuneration in the Community 
c1 v1l service must move in parallel with that in national. ci v1l 
services. 
2. This principle of pa.rallelj..sm is appliei in practice by Ine3.nS of a 
specific iiXlioator, whi0..h measures the average treni in the purchasing 
pa;qer of sa.la.ries in the national oi vil servioec3 of the Member States. 
For each Member Sta. te, a national specific irxlica. tor is praiuce:i each 
year by reference to the trer.d oOOervErl for a range of functions ani for 
two typioa.l officia.ls in terms of civil sta. tus: an unma.rriro official 
ani a married offio.ial with two depetrlent chUdren. Grade9 are then 
weightai by their respective IXJpuL9.tions in order to oa.lcula te the 
a.nnua.l change over the reference peric:rl. To ca..lcul.a te the total 
1Ixi1cator national specific in:lica.tors a.re weigh.te:i by the total 
emoluments of the respective civil services in relation to the Twelve as 
a whole. 
3. As the specific .i.niioator takes acxxrunt only of general increases in 
remuneration obta.:i.nai on a statutory h:lsis ani therefore excludes any 
ir.rli vidual. measures, 1 t should therefore reflect changes in real net 
terms. It is applie:i to the salary sca.les in the 
Community ci v1l service. 
The use of this iniioator is therefore altogether consistent with the 
objective of parallelism, provided., of course, that the iniioator 
aoourately reflects the general trerx:ls in remuneration. 
!J 
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4. T.he methcxi a.lso provi.des for a. control iniicator l:ased on per capita 
emoluments in national central administrations a.n:l ca.lcul.atai in 
a.ooordanoe w1 th tbe defini t.i.ons given by the European System of 
Integratai Economic Acxxrunts (ESA) t:t:rrl.e:r headings 403 to 413 (see 
Atmex) . It includes gross wages ani salaries, employers' actual social 
contribltions ani impute:l soo.:La.l contributions ani is shown in Table S61 
of tbe Statistica.l Office's annual rep;)rt on treOOs in public service 
remuneration. 
5. In its gross term form (before deduction of tax) the specific intica.tor 
may therefore be considerei as showing sa.la....! treOO.s rather oore in 
sa.la:ry-scale terms seen from the angle ot. employee .in::xJme. By contrast, 
the control iixlicator reflects a.ll c.ia.nges in salary (inclusive of 
employers' social contributions) rega.:rdless of source (in:ii vidual or 
generaJ.) seen from the angle of cost to the employer. 
The two indicators thus present differing app~ in terms of both 
design a.rxi components. It can be a.ssumai tba. t r:Nf:X a sufficientl. y long 
oOOerva.tion pericd, provid.OO. there is rJO element disrupting the system 
(such as reorganizations, changes in salary policy, etc. ) , the two 
irdica.tors should move a.t the same pace. 
6. 'nle Statistica.l Office has therefore attempte:i to COinpU'e the changes in 
these imicators both in real terms, ani in nomina.l terms to eJimj nate 
the effrot of deflators on any divergences. In a.n attempt to umersta.ni 
the technioa.l reasons for the divergences, graphs were drawn up showing 
tbe changes in the in11cators since the roetho:l was intrcxluoed (:t:ase 
1980 ""' 100). Figures for all the Mem'l:er States were circulate::l to all 
those atten::ling the Article 65 meeting on 9 March. 
Comparing the trer:rls in the .in.:lica.tors for all the countries, several 
patterns emergei' in particula.r: 
pericxls w1 th parallel trenis; 
pericxls with (slightly or widely) divergent tren:is; 
ups or downs occurring before or after long periods of pu-a.llel 
trams. 
The d1 SQlJSSion in brief 
7. Various points were made by different speakers. 'nlese are listEd 
overleaf more to fill in on the discussion. There is no neei at this 
stage to specify in:lividua.l positions. 
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8. Sane speakers first pointai out that it would in fact be surprising 
if the inlioa.tors did InC'JV'e in parallel &-xi did ooinoide. They gave 
va:rious reasons for the di vergetl()98: 
- sa1l covera:l a. much h.igge.r population than SI, 2 ani was therefore 
ver:y differen.t; 
- pri v"'B.tiza.tion of certain sectors of the administration bad resul tei 
1n job los..~, poss.ihl y affecting S61; 
- there could be ir.crooses witL"'lout tl".e saJ.axy scales ~ily 
being adjusted (adva:ncements in step, regrad.ing) ; 
- saJ.axy scales did not in:va.riably sl1ow changes in remuneration (e.g. 
bonuses); 
- the eJ...imination of categories of officiaJ. at the lower erd of the 
sa.1.a.ry scale as a result of computerization prcxiucei a 'na.tura.l' 
increase in tot.al emoluments, as the rt.RM rore-highl y qualifia:i 
staff were recrui tai at higher saJ.ary levels; 
- one of the logioa.l expla.na.tions of the change in S61 was therefore 
to be sought in the effects of staffing structure; 
- the different nature of the two in:licators meant that same groups 
of officiaJ..s might be less well representei or not representai at 
all in the specific in::licator; this did not cover (sometimes 
rightly) the population coverei by 861; nor did it cover everyone 
in the ministries sootor, which should nevertheless be the key 
component; 
- any change in the processing of data on totaJ. emoluments could 
produce sudden variations; 
- iniicators more appropriate than the tota.l emolument irxlicator 
might well a.lso exist ani be pnbJ 1 s1:100 by na. tiona.l sta. tistics 
depa.rtroents; th.e.se might not differ that much from the national 
S61, ~..reby higblighting the problem of their divergence from the 
sper;tfic irrlioator; 
- the effect of part-time working a.rxi the way in which it was 
reflectei in S61 might also have an impact (at present 861 took 
ao::xnmt of each iDdividuaJ. as working £ull-time: the counting of 
actual hours worke::l could therefore affect S61) ; 
- the freezing of roorui tment could also have a.n .ilnpsct as this 
helpei prcx:luce an ageing population a.trl therefore increase average 
total emoluments; 
-· changes in the component-s roa.king up S61 but not includei in the 
specific in:iiek.1.tor (e.g. employers' social. contributions) could 
possihl y be one of the reasons for the eli vergence. 
All these factors could welJ. explain the differer.t0e9 between cha:nges 
in the control in.i.ioa.tor ani changes in the specific iniica tor. 
However, what was samewha. t surpris.ing was that, with on1 y a ver:y few 
exoeptions, it was ~ 861 which :mova:l faster . This could suggest 
a systata. tic bias. 
--------
1 Control i:rxiicator. 
2 Specific iniica.tor (or parallelism iniica.tor) . 
lS 
•• 
• 
9. In answer to some of those crit.iaizing the use of S61 as be:Ulg 
tbeoretica.lly i:ooampa.ra.hle w1 th tbe specific irdioa.tor, 1 t was 
p:>inted out tbat it was not a case of a.pploo a.m. pears am that like 
could he campa.red w1 th like. Same speakers also notei that there had 
been greater parallel.ism before 1980, or in other words a more 
homogeneous d.evelopnent of 861 ani the spooific intl.cator, which lei 
one logically to ask why tb.e divergences after 1980. What is more, 
these trerrls were more m'11Dger.reous for SOitW3 oountri.es than for 
others, ra.ising even more quest:io.~ . 
10. Sane roore deta.:Llai tlleories were adva.noe.i by some delegates to 
a.ooount for the variations: 
- for Italy, the more pronounced variation in 1987 oould have been 
causei by implementation of ~~ nEN ag--.ree:rent approvai in 1986; 
remuneration con-rponents not ~.rei by the agrE?anent ani not taken 
into aooount in the S'_Pe0j_fio ir.dica.tor had prcduoei an irorease in 
emoluments; moreover, generaJ~ y speaking, restrictions on 
recruitment meant a.n ageing of t..he population ani therefore an 
increase in total emoluments; 
- for the Nether 1&-.d.s , an increase in gros..s rem1J.l.'lera tion in 1985 had 
not affootai total emoluments rut had sut:Sta.ntia.ll y a.1 terei 'tl"'le 
gross specific il'Xiicator (in wr.d.ch employers I soc1al. contributions 
a.re not de1.ucted). 1b9 operation had a.cri;ua.lly OODSistai of 
transferr.ir..g a contribution p:rld by ~"18 employer to the employee's 
salary, incr83.S:i ng the g'.rof"~ salary a.c:xJOrd.ingl y. 
Work to he drme 
11. As in:lica.tei al:ove, the illll'nErlia.te object of the exercise was to 
expla1..n the divergences which had appa'U"ei j.n a. few countries between 
the two in:lica.tors. For this purpose furt.her data covering the 
period 1980 to 1989 were t..o he sen~ i.ri.' by the clep9xtments respons.ible 
in the Member States to ena.ble tJle working party to gauge the effect 
of the various factors mentionai at e. 
12. It emergei during the d.L.~ons that one reason for the divergences 
might lie in the fact that the total emoluments S61 was not 
restrictei to the ministries. To el.im:l.na.te this PJSS1 hle souroe of 
variation, the depl.rtments responsible were to provide the following 
figures for 1989: 
- total emoluments correspon:i1.ng exactly to the }X)pulation of the 
national ministries; 
- a deta.ilei breakdown of the components of the above emoluments 
( w1 th particular reference to employers I socia.l contributions) ; 
- the staff complement corrffi1.10Irling to these total emoluments, by 
category ani grade, including a breakdown for those on part- ani 
full-tilDe working (or the complement :in ma.n/years); 
- where possible, a breakdown by category ani grade. 
13. It a.lso emergoo. that another reason for the va:ria:tion.s oould be that 
the population usei to ~culate the specific iniica.tor was 
insufficient. This meant tba.t a. different line of i.nqu1ry was callEd 
for ani the departments respons.il:ile were therefore, where possible, 
to supplement the informa;t:lon tra.nsm.i tta:l each yea.r. It was agreai 
that it would be useful. to have figures, espec.1a.lly for 1989, showing 
not only the staff complement of the :oa.tiODa.l mintstries by category 
ani grade but a.lso the corresponii.ng saJ.aries. 
14. By the same token, 1 t would be useful to ba.v'"e deta.UOO. lists of the 
types of sa.l.a'ry adjustment effected since 1980; this would make it 
possible to see for each public service exactly bow these increases 
were made ani to extrapolate the divergence factor attril::utable to 
the non-general. increases. 
15. FiDaJ.ly, 1 t was deoj de:l that the statisticaJ. departments oould, if 
tbey so wisbai, propose any regula.rly publ.isba:l national 1niica tor 
which might throw some light on the problem unier discussion. 
• 
